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 Over 27% of arms transfers between 2000 and 2013 from the United States to other 
nations were to the Middle East North Africa region.  The region contains few democracies, is 
largely composed of nations that are considered not free, and tend to be at the epicenter of 
negative events that can have global effects.  Previous research has analyzed U.S. arms sales to 
other nations in an attempt to understand U.S. motives, but has been limited by not specifically 
addressing the MENA region.  Why do we see such a large percentage of U.S. arms being sold in 
the region? The research uses data from SIPRI, the World Bank, and various U.S. governmental 
departments to analyze the level of arms transfers, trade, liberties, and security agreements in the 
region in an attempt to identify any correlations that may explain such high arms transfer levels.  
The findings suggest that there is no significant correlation between democracy and freedoms 
with arms sales in the region contesting previous broader studies. The data does suggest that 
there are specific U.S. security-arrangements in the region coupled with trade relationships that 
may contribute to the large number of arms transfers in the region. 
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Section 1:  Introduction 
 
Over 28% of arms transfers from the United States between the years 2000-2013 are to 
nations that comprise the region known as MENA, or the Middle East and North Africa.  This is 
approximately $28 billion USD of the $97.5 billion USD worth of total arms transfers worldwide 
(SIPRI 2014). Another way to look at it is that over a quarter of U.S. arms transfers are 
conducted with 15% of recipients.  Why do we see this high percentage of arms transfers go to 
such a low percentage of the potential recipients? 
  The U.S. signed an $11 billion USD arms deal with Qatar in 2014 (Reuters/Stringer 
2014) despite controversial accusations that Qatar has ties with Islamic extremist groups that are 
a threat to U.S. interests and security.  The agreement included the transfer of sophisticated 
Apache attack helicopters, Patriot air defense systems, and Javelin missile systems (Mazzetti 
2015).  More significant perhaps, is that states in the Middle East region are frequently using the 
weapons the U.S. sells them instead of merely stockpiling them. 
 The MENA region has been a contentious one over the past decades. The Arab Spring, 
the rise of the Islamic State (IS), the Syrian Civil War, unrest and violence in Libya, the spread 
of terrorist organizations in North Africa, and the Houthi uprising in Yemen have contributed to 
maintaining a state of turmoil over the past years.  Saudi Arabia is using F-15 fighter jets bought 
from Boeing to bomb Houthi rebels in Yemen, while the United Arab Emirates are flying F-16 
fighter jets bought from Lockheed Martin to bomb both Yemen and Syria (Mazzetti 2015).  The 
Kingdom of Jordan has joined other Arab countries, including Bahrain and the afore mentioned 
nations of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in battling Islamic State forces in Syria, 
in retaliation to the burning of their downed pilot earlier this year.  Jordan is requesting more 
military support and munitions from the United States in order to escalate their participation in 
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bombing IS.  The U.S. and Jordan signed a new memorandum of understanding in February that 
committed the U.S. to increase its military assistance, including the transfer of arms, from $660 
million USD a year to $1 billion USD per year for 2015-2017 (Stewart 2015).  The U.S. is 
providing its MENA allies, almost all non-democratic, with the means to exercise conflict on one 
another. 
 The ongoing nuclear discussions between Iran and the P5+1 countries have contributed to 
tensions in the region as well.  Sectarianism between Arab Sunni states and Shia Iran has been 
argued as cause for instability within the Middle East region, both sides fearing increased Iranian 
regional influence.  Some of the arms transfers between the U.S. and Middle East countries can 
be viewed as an attempt on part of Sunni nations to bolster their own security against an Iranian 
threat, real or imagined.   
 This is in addition to the lack of an Israeli/Palestinian two-state solution that has been 
viewed as a major source of the instability in the region.  The plight of the Palestinians residing 
in Gaza and the Occupied Territories is oft cited as the reason/excuse for terrorist activities 
aimed at the U.S. because of its support to the State of Israel (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006).  The 
undisclosed fact that Israel is the only nation in the region to possess nuclear weapons can be 
attributed to the desire of Muslim nations to increase their military posture as a counter to Israel.   
With all the conflict and instability in the MENA region, why would the U.S. sell arms to 
nations that have questionable ties to terrorism, isn’t a partner in a Collective Defense 
Agreement (CDA), or share in similar form of representative democracy?  There are limited 
democratic governments in the region, not counting Turkey, which is a member of the North 
Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO).  This is an important question to explore in order to 
understand why the U.S. executes arms transfers. 
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One can demonstrate that during the Cold War the U.S. sold arms to nations for security 
and/or denying the spread of communism (Meernik et al. 1998; Pierre 1981; Kemp 1994).  Arms 
transfers were part of bilateral security agreements or arrangements among multilateral security 
institutions, such as NATO.  U.S. arms transfers have increased since the end of the Cold War, 
especially to the MENA region.  Unlike NATO countries, more than a quarter of the arms 
transfers go to a region that is less stable and primarily ruled by autocratic governments.  This 
spurred the research question:  Does the level of U.S. arms transfers influence security 
agreements in the MENA region? 
There has been an increased U.S. military presence in the Middle East since 2001.  Much 
of this is due to the War on Terror and Overseas Contingency Operations since the 9/11 attacks.  
However, there is also a significant U.S. military presence spread across the globe, especially 
amongst countries that it sells arms to.  The increased “footprint” of the U.S. military in the 
Middle East lends credence to the assumption that the U.S. has a security interest in the region.  
Additionally, many countries in the Middle East have rich oil and natural gas deposits that are 
vital to the global economy. Political, security, and/or economic reasons may lie behind the U.S. 
transferring arms.   
U.S. arms transfers fall under the Security Assistance (SA) Programs outlined in the 
Security Assistance Management Manual (Agency 2015).  SA is a group of programs ranging 
from military education and training to providing defense articles, such as arms, to foreign 
nations.  SA Programs are administered by the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  SA falls under the broader realm of Security Cooperation (SC).  SC includes all 
DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments.  Its purpose is to build a 
defense and security relationship, promote U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly 
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military capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with access to host nations if needed.  The DoD 
considers SC as an integrally important tool of national security and foreign policy (Agency 
2015). 
SC and SA Programs are diplomatic tools that are used by the DoS and DoD to achieve 
certain goals that fall under the security and political realms.  International Relations Theories 
are typically used to analyze observed trends in foreign policy.  A high amount of arms transfers 
correlated with high trade volume, democratic governments, and civil liberties would concur 
with classical neo-liberal theory.  On the other hand, a high amount of arms transfers correlated 
with security agreements, military bases, and military alliances would concur with neo-realist 
theory.  
A regional level of analysis of the MENA allows for the study of possible regional trends.  
There are not enough cases for a regression model, however there is enough data available to 
establish any possible correlations between arms transfers, trade, civil liberties, regime type, and 
security agreements in the region.  The data suggests a stronger argument for the neo-realist 
theory than that of the neo-liberal.  Democracy and liberties similar to that of the U.S. appears 
not to play a role in the decision to transfer arms to the MENA region.  Security agreements 
between recipient nations and the U.S. do suggest a more plausible reason for the amount of 
arms that are transferred.  Additionally, trade relationships between the region and the U.S. may 
also influence the decision to transfer arms, but the degree of influence is uncertain.  
This paper will proceed with a review of the literature relating to arms transfers.  Then, a 
discussion of international relations theories and how they may apply to arms transfers in the 
MENA region.  Following this, I discuss the research method and varying hypothesis related 
with neo-liberal theory and neo-realist theory.  Afterwards, I present my empirical evidence and 
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data analysis and discuss my findings.  The paper concludes by returning to the original research 
question and summarizing my findings and contribution. 
Section 2:  Literature Review 
 
 The literature concerning arms transfers is limited, however expands when including 
military and foreign aid.  This is acceptable as arms transfers can fall under either heading as 
well as stand alone as a variable.  The majority of the literature tends to support one of two 
primary IR theories:  neo-realist or neo-liberal.  Some scholars believe that human rights, 
democratic governance, and trade positively affect the decision of the U.S. to trade arms with 
another nation, supporting a neo-liberal view.  Other scholars contend that these things have 
nothing to do with the U.S.’s decision to trade arms.  Rather, security and military agreements 
are the main factors driving the decision by the U.S. to trade arms with other nations, supporting 
a neo-realist view.  The literature concentrates on these factors that are associated with the 
theories.  Each scholar does not always include each variable within their work, but they 
contribute to the argument of what may drive U.S. arms transfers to other nations.  The literature 
attempts to explain the reasons for arms transfers by focusing on the aforementioned factors. 
Democracy and Human Rights: 
 
 Neo-liberals may view that the respect for human rights and democratic governance are 
important concerns in U.S. foreign policy.  These two factors encompass civil liberty pre-
requisites, or pre-conditions, of a developed and modern nation state.  The U.S., and other 
democracies, has a more robust and positive foreign policy with nations that are similar to it.  
Arms transfers and military aid have been identified as tools of foreign policy.  Several scholars 
have debated the importance of human rights and democratic governments on providing military 
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assistance and arms to other nations. The Carter and Reagan administrations, for example, took 
into consideration the human rights abuses of prospective arms buying nations and often decided 
not to sell those nations arms (Poe 1991).  Poe bases his conclusions by analyzing a random 
sample of military aid recipients during both administrations.  Human rights and democracy 
continued to be relevant determinants after the Cold War when assessing the eligibility of a 
country to receive U.S. military aid in the form of arms exports.  Developing countries with a 
good human rights score and the highest democracy score were 22% more likely to receive arms 
using a regression model of 92 countries between the years 1990-1994 (Blanton 2000).  Of 
significance however, is that her findings suggested that the Middle East is somewhat of an 
outlier as the roles of democracy and human rights are unclear when deciding to export arms to 
the region.  In a later study, Blanton (2005) again uses a regression model, and extends her 
focused research between the years 1981-2001.  Her findings suggest that human rights played a 
larger role in determining which countries receive arms post Cold War, however the democratic 
institutions in the recipient countries had only a small, yet positive, influence.  In fact, while a 
country was 11% less likely to receive arms for every unit increase in repressiveness, a one-point 
increase in democracy corresponded to a 25% decrease in the amount of arms exported (Blanton 
2005).  The studies are consistent with a neo-liberal approach and suggests that a recipient 
nation’s civil liberties, in the form of a democratic government and a positive human rights 
record, influences the U.S.’s decision to conduct arms transfers and supply military aid. 
There is another argument however that diminishes the importance of democracy and 
human rights when observing U.S. arms transfers.  Other literature supports a neo-realist view by 
suggesting that human rights and democratic governance played a minimal, if any, role in 
determining which nations receive arms and foreign aid.  A similar model to the one used by 
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Blanton, but including a larger sample of countries, argues that human rights abusing countries 
are actually more likely to receive weapons from the U.S. and that military alliances play a larger 
role in determining arms transfers (Perkins and Neumayer 2010).  Perkins and Neumayer found 
that military alliances and recipient nations’ military capacity were more positively and 
statistically significantly correlated with arms transfers than were human rights and democratic 
governance.   Similar trends were found during the 1980s when analyzing foreign aid to African 
nations.  Human rights played a minimal role, while security alliances played a pivotal role, in 
determining U.S. foreign aid allocations to African countries (Schraeder et al. 1998).  A more 
recent study found that the top ten recipients of U.S. weapons in 2011 were all cited for 
significant human rights shortcomings by the DoS, including the use of U.S. weapons for 
repressive uses against their own populations (Toombs and Smith 2012).  Arms transfers and 
military aid to the MENA region have not been significantly addressed to determine the 
influence of human rights records and democratic governments on the U.S. decision to provide 
said arms.  There are noticeable disagreements on the importance of human rights and 
democracy in both Cold War and post-Cold war periods. 
Economic Interests and Trade: 
 
 Many scholars view arms transfers, and the arms trade in general, as a result of a growing 
globalized economy.  In essence, arms transfers have a positive effect on the domestic and global 
economy.  Weapons-supplying countries have become more economically focused when 
transferring arms since the end of the Cold War, no longer gifting weaponry, but focusing on 
selling arms (Peleg 1977).  It is argued that once held U.S. military secrets are now being sold 
off to foreign nations due to the crossover of technologies between military and civilian 
hardware and the growing international market, leading to an technological interdependence that 
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benefits both sides (Keller and Nolan 1997).  This trend is not only U.S. specific, but is also 
observed in Russia and former states of the Soviet Union.  Maintaining the domestic arms 
industry in a post-Cold War environment drove the U.S. to seek out willing buyers in order to 
secure jobs and production rates, despite recipient nations’ human rights records (Yanik 2006).  
The arms market in general has shifted from a single-country production pattern to a multi-
national global enterprise that becomes interdependent on international cooperation (Bitzinger 
1994; Brooks 2005).  Arms are no longer planned, manufactured, and solely used by the 
producing country.  Transnational research and production agreements resulted in a proliferation 
of weapons technology and manufacturing.  It is even argued that arms transfers lead to weapons 
standardization, which in turn leads to increased trade liberalization between the producer and 
the recipient (Wolf and Leebaert 1978).  Additionally, a regression model of developing 
countries receiving arms exhibited a greater probability of receiving arms if they were viewed as 
important trading partners (Perkins and Neumayer 2010).  The previous examples illustrate a 
growing economic benefit for both the U.S. domestic economy and the international economy.   
Other scholars suggest that the economic benefit, especially domestically, is limited and 
insignificant.  A regression analysis of time-series for five arms exporting countries found that 
there was little economic benefit to exporters compared to strategic and security benefits 
(Fontanel et al. 1985).  Fontanel’s study is a little outdated, but did argue that economic lobbies 
which formed due to arms transfers made an unsubstantiated argument that arms transfers have a 
positive economic impact on the exporting country.  This may explain some other scholars’ 
attempts at suggesting that trade and arms sales are positively correlated.  Studying arms exports 
under the Clinton administration found similar results, suggesting that arms exports only 
marginally contribute to national employment and trade domestically; the job production was 
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more noticeable outside of the U.S. due to a growing global economy (Hartung 1995).  The 
global production trend does little to stimulate the domestic economy.  Laborers and 
manufacturing plants in other nations are benefiting from U.S. arms contractors instead of local 
workers and plants. The arguments on economic benefits and the growing global economy are 
varied.  Scholarly work has not attempted to correlate arms transfers with trade directly.  The 
literature is lacking due to this, specifically when analyzing the MENA region separate from 
other regions in order to determine any significance between trade and arms transfers. 
Security and Political Interests: 
 
 Scholars agree that security and political interests play a role in arms transfers.  They 
disagree on how arms transfers and the arms industry affect security and political interests and 
how significant of a role they play.  A neo-liberal view suggests that an increased global arms 
industry creates a interdependence amongst nations for weapons production, which in turn leads 
to increasing the cost of armed conflict amongst one another, and thus creates a more secure 
global environment from which to operate within (Brooks 2005).  This argument was presented 
after analyzing the growing transnationalism of multinational corporations and the 
interdependency created by the global arms market.  Blanton (2005) suggests a more realist view 
by admitting that countries where U.S. troops were present were not only more likely to receive 
arms, but also likely to receive greater amounts.  This finding supports a view that U.S. security 
is a vital element when electing to transfer arms to other nations by ensuring that the host nation 
has the interoperability capabilities with U.S. weapons and systems.   
Political and security interests in the MENA region are also accomplished by providing 
conventional arms and technologies to both Israel and Muslim states in order to ensure that a 
balance of power exists, along with ensuring internal stability within MENA regimes (Neumann 
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1995).  The provision of arms enforces the regimes’ internal security while at the same time 
allowing them the ability to project power against a superiorly equipped Israel.  Promoting and 
securing U.S. interests were instrumental in determining whether countries received arms after 
the 1991 Gulf War, specifically when focused on the “trinity of interests” comprising Middle 
East peace, Israeli and friendly Arab national security, and access to energy sources (Hajjar 
2002).  Arms transfers and defense cooperative agreements were used as diplomatic tools to 
ensure that the U.S.’s interests were addressed and secured.  Security and political interests are 
definitely tied to U.S. arms transfers, however, its impact is not clear.  There is still debate on 
whether securing U.S. interests is the driving force in helping to arm the MENA region.  The 
majority of the works cited have used specific case studies to argue their points using qualitative 
data rather than quantitative. 
 There has been scholarly work that denounces the notion that arms transfers, or any 
interaction with and towards foreign nations, have a positive effect on security and political 
interests.  A regression analysis of countries receiving U.S. arms and military support and acts of 
terror against the U.S. originating from those countries demonstrate that there is a correlation 
between the two.  In short, the more a country is dependent on the U.S. for arms and military 
support, the more likely that the U.S. and its citizens will be targets of acts of terror (Neumayer 
and Pluemper 2011).  Another study finds that states with active foreign policies with the U.S., to 
include military and economic alliances, are more likely to experience incidents of transnational 
terror than states that are not as involved in international affairs (Savun and Phillips 2009).  
These studies suggest that security and political interests would actually diminish with increased 





 The literature is extensive and covers many different aspects associated with arms 
transfers in general.  The scholars who have used empirical evidence have used large n 
regression analysis to attempt to identify trends tied to arms transfers and foreign aid to be 
applied on a global scale.  Other scholars have used case studies to attempt to find a correlation 
between arms transfers and other aspects, to include civil liberties, trade, or security. The 
available literature lacks an analysis of all the factors focusing specifically on the MENA region 
and attempting to explain why over a quarter of U.S. arms transfers are to that specific region.  
The analysis is either too broad or not broad enough, in that it only looks at one specific factor.  
A regional level of analysis allows for the study of regional trends that can be observed and 
compared.  Focusing on the MENA region and identifying any correlations between arms 
transfers, trade, security agreements and civil liberties may provide a stronger argument for 
which factor has a greater influence on transferring arms to the region.  
Section 3:  Theory 
 
Arms transfers fall into the realm of foreign policy according to the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency.  International relations theory can help policy makers make sense of the 
information that bombards them on a daily basis.  “Even policymakers who are contemptuous of 
“theory” must rely on their own, often unstated, ideas about how the world works in order to 
decide what to do.” (Walt 1998).  My research will apply theoretical assumptions in order to 
“understand” trends and correlations that are observed when analyzing arms transfers in the 
Middle East region. 
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 Two of the prevailing international relations theories are the neo-realist theory and the 
neo-liberal theory.  David Baldwin (1993) brought together scholars to discuss some of the key 
debates of both theories consisting of topics such as relative vs. absolute gains, international 
cooperation, and the nature and consequences of anarchy.  The arguments are vast and there are 
many different aspects and factors that each theory attempts to explain or understand.  In relation 
to arms transfers some broad inferences can be made based upon neo-realist and neo-liberal 
theory.  A neo-realist may view arms transfers to other nations as an attempt to ensure the 
security of the state by expanding the capabilities of other nations who assist in ensuring the 
transferring nation’s security.  Self-preservation and security are the primary factors that would 
influence the transfer of arms.  However, a neo-liberal may view arms transfers as a natural 
result of an expanding and interdependent international trade relationship.  As trade increases 
with a recipient nation, so would arms transfers.  Another neo-liberal view would be that arms 
transfers are a natural result of the U.S. acknowledging, and rewarding, other nations who have 
similar political institutions and values.  The more similar the recipient nation appears to be in 
those regards with the U.S., the more likely they would be to receive arms as a tool of trade and 
cooperation. 
This research attempts to focus on some of the more specific assumptions made by other 
scholars related to the theories.  For this purpose, assumptions made by Blanton (2000, 2005) 
and by Perkins and Neumayer (2010) are referenced concerning the two theories and how they 
apply to arms transfers.  Blanton’s research suggests that the U.S. takes a country’s human rights 
record and form of government into account when making the decision to transfer arms to them.  
Her findings support a neo-liberal view of arms transfers.  Perkins and Neumeyer’s research, on 
the other hand, would suggest otherwise, finding that human rights and democracy have little to 
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do with the decision, rather military alliances, geographical location, and historical trade ties play 
a larger role.  Their findings support a more neo-realist view of arms transfers.  Both Blanton’s 
and Perkins’ works focused on large samples of third world, or developing countries, during 
various time periods covering much of the 1980s through the early 2000s.  However, their work 
never specifically addresses the MENA region by itself.  My research focuses on this region 
during a more recent time period, 2000-2013, in order to see if their theoretical assumptions can 




 Blanton’s research would suggest that mutual values, democratic governance and human 
rights play a significant role in determining whether or not the U.S. provides arms to other 
nations.  Perkins and Neumayer suggest that established trade partnerships influence the decision 
to transfer arms.  These specific aspects of neo-liberalism would suggest that there is a positive 
correlation between arms transfers and trade, democracy, civil and political liberties, and human 
rights.  The assumption would mean that these factors foster an atmosphere of enduring 
cooperation amongst the U.S. and other states that prefers greater long-run benefits to attaining 
short-term, and specific, benefits more heavily related to security concerns.  
 
H1:  U.S. arms transfers to the MENA states are positively correlated and influenced by 






 Perkins and Neumayer suggest that most neo-liberal factors such as democratic 
governance, civil liberties, and human rights do not affect the decision to trade arms with other 
nations.  Instead, they argue that these factors play almost no role.  They do argue that arms have 
been exported to serve the state’s security interests.  Recipient nation’s military alliances with 
producing nations had a significant impact on whether or not arms were transferred.  In addition 
to this, more capable recipient nation militaries were more likely to receive arms, as were those 
where the U.S. had a significant trade interest.  Based on their study, military security 
agreements with recipient nations would suggest a neo-realist view of ensuring U.S. security is 
projected abroad.  When paired with specific economic concerns in the region, the presence of 
significant security agreements in the MENA region would more strongly support the neo-realist 
assumption. 
 
H2:  U.S. arms transfers to the MENA states are positively correlated and influenced by 
the recipient nations’ security arrangements with the U.S. 
Section 4:  Concepts, Definitions and Data 
 
 My research design is based off of previous research conducted by Blanton (2000, 2005) 
and Perkins and Neumayer (2010).  Their studies made use of a regression analysis of a large n 
sample of third world and developing nations.  My study is focused on a specific region, the 
MENA, which does not allow me to conduct a similar regression analysis.  Instead, I conduct a 
comparison study of the nations in the region by using simple correlation tables and a method of 
agreement to determine which hypothesis most strongly supports the findings.  I evaluate data 
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from all the countries that the U.S. transferred arms to between the years 2000-2013.  I then 
separate the countries into three categories:  MENA, NATO, and All1.  The countries are 
separated into categories to better analyze the data for the research area, and compare that data to 
the total number of countries and to a regional trade and defense area such as NATO.  The 
analysis and comparison highlights similarities and differences between the MENA and other 
regions and countries. The primary data used, similar to the previous studies, will be arms 
transfers, trade, democratic governance, security agreements, and civil liberties.  The variables 
are either similar or slightly modified from the previous works in order to facilitate a more 
specific understanding of what drives arms transfers to the region. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Arms Transfers:  Arms transfers are the dependent variable of the study.  These will be 
evaluated in terms of monetary worth of conventional weapons platforms, such ships, planes, and 
weapons systems, which are transferred from the U.S. to another nation. Arms sales will not 
include any transfer of nuclear technology or weaponry.  I use data compiled from SIPRI (2014) 
just as Perkins and Neumayer did in their study.  SIPRI compiles the annual amount of arms 
transfers from the U.S. to other countries using their Trend Indicator Value, or TIV.  The TIV 
determines the monetary value of arms that were transferred on an annual basis.  This is helpful 
because often agreements are announced or published in the form of an entire transaction.  For 
example, if the U.S. agrees to an $11 billion dollar agreement with another nation, the agreement 
is not to provide $11 billion dollars worth of arms in a one-year period.  Instead, the agreement 
may include providing arms in increments over a seven-year period.  It is in these instances 
                                                
1 See Appendices 1 through 3 for by name lists of country categories 
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where the TIV is useful in evaluating what the cost of the arms transferred for any given year 
actually are.  The TIVs used for this study are expressed in U.S. dollar amounts. 
 
Independent Variables 
Trade:  Trade refers to the monetary amount, expressed in U.S. dollars, of trade conducted 
between the U.S. and the recipient nation on an annual basis.  Trade is one of the variables also 
used by other scholars in their studies on arms transfers (Perkins and Neumayer 2010; Blanton 
2000, 2005).  My data is compiled using information from the World Bank (2014).  The amount 
of trade between the U.S. and other nations may suggest whether the volume of trade conducted 
affects arms transfers.   
 
Security Arrangements:  This variable is a broad heading for three different variables.  My 
variable differs with that of Perkins and Neumayer as I do more than just evaluate whether there 
is a military alliance between the U.S. and a recipient nation.  I take this into consideration in the 
form of Collective Defense Agreements (CDA), but I also take into considerations whether the 
U.S. has a military base in the nation and whether there is a standing Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) present between the two nations.  I use qualitative and quantitative data from multiple 
sources to establish the level of security arrangements.  The Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) provides information regarding security arrangements that it has gathered into various 
reports.  The CRS furnishes data on current and past SOFAs that have been agreed on between 
the U.S. and other nations (Mason 2009).  SOFAs will either be counted as existing or not 
existing.  Additionally, the CRS also furnish information on formal alliances and Collective 
Defense Agreements that the U.S. participates in (Garcia and Mason 2009; "Treaties in force 
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(Online)"  2013; Collective Defense Agreements  2014).  This will also be counted as either 
existing or not.  Finally, the Department of Defense furnishes a base structuring report that will 
be used to determine whether or not a U.S. military base is present in a recipient nation 
("Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2008 Baseline (A Summary of 
DoD's Real Property Inventory)"  2008). 
 
Regime Type:  Regime type refers to the type of government in place for recipient nations 
(Toombs and Smith 2012; Schraeder et al. 1998). Regime type will be determined as either 
democratic or non-democratic by using qualitative data furnished by the Freedom House List of 
Electoral Democracies (2014).  I will not differentiate between different types of democracies or 
republics.  I will instead differentiate between recipient governments who either have a 
democratic form of government or do not.  It is important to note that I will define the 
government based off what it was for the majority of the studied period.  For example, Tunisia is 
currently considered an electoral democracy as of 2012.  However it was not prior.  Therefore I 
define Tunisia as a non-democracy since it was not considered one for the majority of researched 
time period. 
 
Freedom:  Previous work focused heavily on the level of human rights protections that recipient 
nations had (Blanton 2000, 2005; Perkins and Neumayer 2010).  I substitute their variable for 
one that measures the level of civil and political freedoms present in arms-receiving nations as 
the variable, freedom.  The logic for this substitution is that a country with a positive score for an 
individual citizen’s level of political and civil liberties should reflect a positive record of 
maintaining basic human rights.  A negative score, on the other hand, may reflect a higher 
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propensity for the nation to exercise human rights violations.  The nation’s score does not mean 
that it violates human rights, however it does suggest that the possibility for these violations is 
stronger in countries that are less free.  I use the scoring system of free, not free, or partly free 
from the Freedom House Freedom of the World Survey(2014) to measure the level of freedom.  
This survey works well because it does not rate the governments that are in charge; rather it rates 
the real-world rights and freedoms that individuals are able to enjoy in their countries.  This 
provides a useful score that is not skewed by governments’ official policies and open statements 
that fail to reflect the reality on the ground.  Similar to the regime type variable, I define freedom 
based off the values provided for the majority of the studied period. 
Section 5:  Empirical Evidence and Analysis 
 
 This section provides the analysis of the data that has been collected.  Various methods 
are used in order to help create a clearer picture of the relationships between arms transfers and 
the independent variables.  The analysis has been conducted focusing on the MENA region 
specifically, as well as on NATO countries and the total number of countries that the U.S. has 
transferred arms to as reported by SIPRI for the time period studied.  The comparisons provide 








 The MENA region boasts some interesting statistical figures when compared to NATO 
and all the countries combined.  The average value of arms transfers to the MENA region is 
significantly higher, by over $500 million, when compared to NATO and when compared to all 
arms recipients together.  The dollar amount of total transfers within the studied time period is 
Displaying general statistical data for arms transfers 
Data Source:  SIPRI TIV (2000-2013) 
 
also higher when compared to NATO countries.  The U.S. has historical trade ties and security 
arrangements with NATO and a fair expectation would be to see greater arms transfer values to 
it.  The data in Table 1 suggests that there is something unique about the MENA region and the 
U.S. arms transfers to the region.  The following areas evaluate the relationship of arms transfers 









Table 1:  Summary of Arms Transfer Data (in millions) 
Group Mean Median SD Min Max 
      
MENA 1847 616 2316 24 7357 
NATO 1156 421 1525 0 5428 
All 1005 140 1904 0 11153 
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Democracy and Civil/Political Liberties 
 
Table 2 provides an analysis of the relationship between arms transfers and two other variables:  
democracy and civil/political liberties.  The analysis is of all the countries that the U.S. 
transferred arms to during the studied time period.  The variance between the variables is nearly 
split right down the middle.  The variables of democracy and liberties are just as abundant when 
observing the upper half of recipients as when observing the lower half.  Additionally, the 
nations considered “Not Free” were just as likely to have received a higher value of arms 
transfers than a lower value.  Democratic governments outweigh non-democracies by a  
Evaluation of Arms Transfers using the median amount as a divide to display correlation between amount and regime type and freedoms 
Source:  SIPRI and Freedom House 
 
substantial margin.  67% of arms transfer recipients have democratic governments.  It appears 
that democracies have a higher chance of receiving arms, but democracies do not necessarily 
receive a higher value of arms compared to non-democracies.  Freedoms enjoyed in the recipient  
nations appear to be a better indicator than democracy.  In addition, since 74 out of 97 recipient 
nations are either “Free” or “Partly Free”, it appears freedoms enjoyed in the recipient country 
may be a better indicator of the U.S.’s willingness to sell arms than their form of government.   
 A different pattern emerges when only the MENA countries are observed.  Democracies 
and freedoms do not appear to affect the value of arms transfers that take place in that region.  
Table 3 evaluates the same variables as Table 2, but only displays the information for MENA 
 
Table 2: Analysis of Arms Transfers and Liberties and Regime Type (Total) 





      
> Median 49 33 16 37 12 
< Median 48 32 16 37 11 
Total 97 65 32 74 23 
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nations.  The overwhelming majority of MENA nations who receive arms have non-democratic 
governments and are considered “Not Free”.  Another stark comparison can be made when 
considering arms transfers to NATO nations.  All NATO recipients, 15 of 21 which are above 
the median value of arms transfers, have democratic governments and are “Free” or “Partly 
Free”.  These variables appear have a higher impact on NATO recipient nations. 
 The analysis considering arms transfers to the MENA region suggests that democratic 
governance and civil/political freedoms do not play a role in the U.S.’s decision to transfer arms 
nor the execution of those transfers.  The majority of the region enjoys a high value of arms 
transfers regardless of their government and freedoms resembling those found in the U.S.  
Analysis of other variables may point to another reason for the high volume observed when 
compared to other nations.     
 
Evaluation of Arms Transfers using the median amount as a divide to display correlation between amount and regime type and 
freedoms.  Uses the same median derived from observing all recipient nations. 




 I use the data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2014) 
and the World Bank to conduct a bivariate analysis to determine if there is a relationship between 
arms transfers and trade between the U.S. and recipient nations.  Simple scatter plot graphs are 
 
Table 3: Analysis of Arms Transfers and Liberties and Regime Type (MENA) 





      
> Median 13 1 12 3 10 
< Median 2 0 2 1 1 
Total 15 1 14 4 11 
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used to display a positive or negative correlation between the two variables.  A linear line 
denotes possible correlation. 
 No significant correlation between arms transfers and trade can be made when analyzing 
the data for all the recipient nations as shown in Figure 1.  There is a slight positive correlation, 
however there are outliers that affect the figure.  Those outliers are traditional trading partners 
consisting of Canada, Mexico, and Japan; as well as South Korea, whose value of arms transfers 
sets it far apart from any other nation.  The correlation becomes slightly more positive when 
those countries are removed.  However, as Figure 2 shows, there are still a significant number of 
countries that have high trade with the U.S. but do not receive many arms, and countries that 
receive a high amount of arms but have little trade with the U.S.  Therefore, the relationship 
between trade and arms transfers appears to be statistically weak. 
Correlation Coefficient:  0.254 
Outliers labeled in bold  




















Figure	  1:	  	  Arms	  Transfers	  vs.	  Trade	  for	  All	  
Recipients	  (2000-­‐2013)	  
Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  2000-­‐2013	  
Linear	  (Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  
2000-­‐2013)	  
 23 
 Isolating the data to include figures of nations in the MENA region provides a different 
observation.  Data displayed in Figure 3 indicates a higher positive correlation between the two 
variables.  Of note however are four particular outliers consisting of the nations Egypt, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  These outliers exhibit extremely high trade values 
and arms transfer values when compared to the other MENA nations that receive arms.  The 
positive correlation increases slightly with these outliers taken into account and removed from 
the analysis, an increase of 0.037.  Unfortunately the sample numbers of countries that receive 
arms in the MENA region are small and the correlation analysis may be inhibited due to this.  
However, it is still of note to observe that trade and arms transfers in the region are positively 
correlated and may suggest a small causal relationship.   
 
 
Correlation Coefficient:  0.372 


















Figure	  2:	  	  Arms	  Transfers	  vs.	  Trade	  for	  All	  
Recipients	  (Outliers	  removed)	  (2000-­‐2013)	  
Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  2000-­‐2013	  
Linear	  (Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  
2000-­‐2013)	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 Lastly, the correlation between arms transfers and trade when observing the NATO 
countries is more closely aligned with the findings of Figure 1.  A positive correlation can be 
observed in Figure 4, however there are also outliers present which, when taken out of the 
analysis, lowers the positive relationship by 0.118.  The two outliers are Canada, which enjoys a 
high level of trade but small level of arms transfers, and the United Kingdom, which has an arms 
transfer value close to $1 billion USD higher than the next highest nation, Greece.  The 
correlation, although positive, does not appear to be causal between arms transfers and trade in 
NATO countries.  Countries with high trade values such as Germany and Canada receive a low 
level of arms transfers, while countries such as Turkey and Greece observe the opposite. 
 
 
Correlation Coefficient:  0.497 
Outliers labeled in bold 
Source: SIPRI and the World Bank 
 
 
The highest positive correlation between the variable of arms transfers and trade are 


















Figure	  3:	  	  Arms	  Transfers	  vs.	  Trade	  for	  MENA	  
(2000-­‐2013)	  
Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  2000-­‐2013	  
Linear	  (Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  
2000-­‐2013)	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are heavily influenced by outlier nations.  Yet, the positive correlation is significant given that it 
is almost twice as much as the correlations observed in NATO countries and within the total 
nation sample of countries receiving U.S. arms transfers.  The relationship between trade and 
arms transfers in the MENA region would suggest a possibility that they influence each other. 
 
Correlation Coefficient:  0.283 
Outliers labeled in bold 




 Security agreements between the U.S. and recipient nations are analyzed by observing the 
number of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), U.S. military bases, and Collective Defense 
Agreements (CDA) that the U.S. has with them.  Table 4 provides an overview taking all 
recipient nations into account.  Security agreements appear to be correspondent with the upper 
half of arms transfer recipients.  More than half those above the median contain a U.S. military 

















Figure	  4:	  	  Arms	  Transfers	  vs.	  Trade	  for	  NATO	  
(2000-­‐2013)	  
Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  2000-­‐2013	  
Linear	  (Total	  Trade	  with	  US	  
2000-­‐2013)	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CDAs are also evident when observing nations below the median, however only two nations in 
that group contain a U.S. military base.  Security agreements appear to become much more 
prevalent, and perhaps significant, when observing all recipient nations. 
 
 
Evaluation of Arms Transfers using the median amount of $140 million USD as a divide to display correlation between amount and security 
agreements  





Table 5 provides security agreement data for the MENA region.  It is displayed in a 
descending order of arms transfer values in order to observe any relationships between the 
amount of arms transfers and security agreements.  Of interest is that almost half of the nations in 
the region receiving arms also contain a U.S. military base but none of the nations have a CDS 
with the U.S.  All of the security agreements are found within nations that are above the median 
of total arms transfer values, but they do not necessarily correlate with the value of arms 
transfers.  For example, Egypt is the second highest recipient of arms transfers during the 
observed period.  Yet, they don’t have one security agreement with the U.S.  Kuwait on the other 
hand is just above the median value of arms transfers and has both a SOFA and a military base.  
Each country in the Persian Gulf region of MENA, with the exception of Yemen, contain a  
U.S. military base and a SOFA regardless of how high the value of arms transfers are. 
 
 
Table 4: Analysis of Arms Transfers and Security Agreements (Total) 





     
> Median 49 31 25 27 
< Median 48 24 2 16 





Table 5: Analysis of Arms Transfers and Security Agreements (MENA)	  
Country	  
Total	  Arms	  Sales	  
from	  2000-­‐2013	   SOFA	   U.S.	  Bases	  	  
Collective	  Defense	  
Agreement	  
UAE	   7357	   1	   1	   0	  
Egypt	   5642	   0	   0	   0	  
Israel	   5512	   1	   0	   0	  
Saudi	  Arabia	   2804	   1	   1	   0	  
Iraq	   2196	   1	   0	   0	  
Morocco	   933	   0	   0	   0	  
Qatar	   710	   1	   1	   0	  
Oman	   616	   1	   1	   0	  
Bahrain	   585	   1	   1	   0	  
Jordan	   500	   1	   0	   0	  
Kuwait	   425	   1	   1	   0	  
Algeria	   178	   0	   0	   0	  
Tunisia	   140	   0	   0	   0	  
Lebanon	   82	   0	   0	   0	  
Yemen	   24	   0	   0	   0	  
 
Evaluation of Arms Transfers using the median amount of $140 million USD as a divide to display correlation between amount and security 
agreements  
Source:  SIPRI, DoD Base Structure Report, Congressional Research Service, Collective Defense Agreements 
 
 NATO countries provide a stark contrast to MENA, however an expected one, as shown 
in Table 6.  NATO was established, in part, as a Collective Defense Agreement to provide a 
united front against the spread of communism in the post World War II era.  Thus, all nations 
that are part of NATO have a CDA and a SOFA with the U.S.  Additionally, 12 of 21 nations 
contain a U.S. military base as well.  Of interest is that all nations containing a military base are 
above the median of arms transfer values.  The outlier countries that don’t are Canada, France 
and the Czech Republic.  Canada can be easily explained as it borders with the U.S. and the need 
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for a base within its borders was not a concern when establishing NATO.  France however, is a 
peculiarity considering it is an historical ally of the U.S.  
 Security agreements appear to be one of the factors that go hand in hand with arms 
transfers in the majority of cases.  That a large proportion of higher value arms transfer-receiving 
nations also have security agreements with the U.S. is evident, but it is not necessarily the rule.   
 
Evaluation of Arms Transfers using the median amount of $140 million USD as a divide to display correlation between amount and security 
agreements  
Source:  SIPRI, DoD Base Structure Report, Congressional Research Service, Collective Defense Agreements 
 
 
Table 6: Analysis of Arms Transfers and Security Agreements (NATO)	  
Country	  
Total	  Arms	  Sales	  





United	  Kingdom	   5428	   1	   1	   1	  
Greece	   4534	   1	   1	   1	  
Turkey	   3356	   1	   1	   1	  
Canada	   2273	   1	   0	   1	  
Italy	   2042	   1	   1	   1	  
Germany	  (FRG)	   1443	   1	   1	   1	  
Netherlands	   1346	   1	   1	   1	  
Spain	   1059	   1	   1	   1	  
Norway	   680	   1	   1	   1	  
Portugal	   621	   1	   1	   1	  
France	   421	   1	   0	   1	  
Denmark	   383	   1	   1	   1	  
Romania	   188	   1	   1	   1	  
Belgium	   172	   1	   1	   1	  
Czech	  Republic	   155	   1	   0	   1	  
Hungary	   82	   1	   0	   1	  
Latvia	   39	   1	   0	   1	  
Lithuania	   27	   1	   0	   1	  
Estonia	   13	   1	   0	   1	  
Bulgaria	   11	   1	   0	   1	  
Slovenia	   0	   1	   0	   1	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High values of arms transfers do not automatically preclude a security agreement with the 
recipient nation.  The MENA region has some form of security agreement with the nations that 
make up the Middle East of the MENA.  The North African and Levant regions of MENA are 
scarcer.  As noted above, the Persian Gulf nations have both a SOFA and U.S. military bases 
suggesting that the Persian Gulf region specifically maybe of more interest to the U.S.’s security 
interests while also enjoying higher levels of arms transfers amongst some of the nations in that 
area.  Even though there are no CDA in the MENA region, security agreements in the region 
suggest that they are a factor in relationship to arms transfers for such a small population of total 





 The following observations can be made about the MENA region after analyzing the 
variables and their relationships with each other.  First, in contrast to Blanton’s (2000, 2005) 
argument, democratic governance and civil/political freedoms appear to have little influence on 
the decision to transfer arms to MENA nations.  It is important to note that she did identify the 
Middle East as an outlier, and it would appear North African nations could be included into the 
same category.  Only two of the nations have had an elected democratic government through the 
majority of the studied time frame.  The majority of nations in the MENA region is considered 
“Not Free” and continues to receive substantial amounts of arms from the U.S. 
 Second, in accordance with Perkins and Neumayer (2010), trade may be positively 
correlated with arms transfers in the MENA region.  There is a positive correlation between arms 
transfers and trade that would support this argument.  However, there are also outlier nations that 
do not support the argument.  Taking individual nations into account may lead to a clearer 
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answer as to how important trade is with a recipient nation versus the argument that this 
relationship is separate from the decision to transfer arms. 
 Third, although not noticed across every country, there are significant security 
agreements with many of the recipient countries in the MENA region, the majority being located 
within the Persian Gulf area.  Higher values of arms transfers do not always correlate with 
security agreements, as with Egypt, but given the size of the sample, an argument can be further 
explored that nations with security agreements can expect some level of arms transfers above the 
observed median value.  This observation would closely align itself with the findings of Perkins 
and Neumayers (2010) who found that military alliances were influential in deciding whether to 
transfer arms.   
 The data does not support hypothesis 1 that democratic governments with similar values 
to the U.S. would be more likely than other non-democratic governments in the MENA to 
receive arms.  The data does support hypothesis 1 when it observes the relationship between 
trade and arms transfers in the MENA.  However, the positive correlation may be easily 
influenced by the presence of significant outlier nations who have high trade and low arms 
transfers, or low trade and high arms transfers.  Further research is necessary in order to evaluate 
what is being traded between the U.S. and countries in the region.  For example, is oil and 
natural gas the main export from MENA countries to the U.S?  In this case, the U.S. may view 
the acquisition of those resources as vital to its security.  However, the trade relationship may 
more heavily support a neo-liberal theory if some other commodity is being exported at a higher 
volume than the natural resources.   
 The data supports hypothesis 2 that arms transfers are positively correlated with security 
agreements in the MENA region.  This support is not inclusive to every country in the region, 
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but as a whole there are positive correlations between arms transfers and security agreements, 
especially when observing the Persian Gulf nations.  Future research may expand on the varying 
tools involved in Security Cooperation and use variables that I did not include in my research.  
For example, I did not evaluate the level of joint training exercises between the U.S. and other 
nations, nor the level of international military exchange programs, preferring to focus on aspects 
that involve the presence of U.S. troops and the open agreement to fight alongside a country. 
 The analysis suggests that the decision to transfer arms to the MENA region is one that is 
more closely aligned with U.S. economic and security interests than with a desire to reward those 
governments with values similar to the U.S.  Previous studies have attempted to understand why 
and how the U.S. decides to transfer its arms to other nations.  There has been debate over the 
reasons and prerequisites.  However, there have been no studies focusing on the MENA region 
specifically.  My contribution to the ongoing discussion of arms transfers has been focused on 
the MENA region and provided comparisons to countries in the NATO alliance and comparisons 
to all other arms recipient nations.  
Section 6:  Conclusion 
 
  Countries in the Middle East and North Africa received over 27% of U.S. arms 
transfers between the years 2000-2013.  This appears to be a continuing trend as the U.S. signed 
an $11 billion USD arms deal with Qatar in 2014.  Over a quarter of U.S. arms went to a region 
containing around 15% of arms recipients during the studied period.  Most of the nations in the 
region do not share any political or ideological similarities with the U.S.  There are few 
democracies and the majority of nations lack individual and political freedoms that are taken for 
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granted by U.S. citizens.  In addition, the region is often the focal point of conflict and 
transnational terrorism.   
 Previous research and studies have attempted to identify reasons behind the decision of 
the U.S. to transfer arms to other countries.  Some research suggests that nations with democratic 
institutions and positive human rights records are more likely to become recipient nations 
(Blanton 2005).  Other research refutes this idea and takes a more realist approach to examining 
the reasoning behind transferring arms to other nations by the U.S. focusing instead on security 
and military alliances (Perkins and Neumayer 2010).  There is no doubt that an economic 
incentive for weapons manufacturers exists, however the U.S. government is the decision maker 
when exporting arms abroad.  A focused study on the MENA region is lacking when attempting 
to understand why the U.S. is exporting such a large volume of arms to the region. 
 The purpose of this research is to specifically focus on arms transfers to the MENA 
region to identify correlations between arms transfers and other variables.  Correlations between 
arms transfers and regime type, freedoms, trade, and security agreements between the U.S. and 
recipient countries may help to identify reasons for why the U.S. is exporting arms to the MENA 
region.  This study also attempts to identify any correlations that would support existing theories 
on arms transfers in order to better understand the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and 
the MENA countries.     
 Democratic forms of government, as well as individual and political freedoms, appear to 
have no effect on whether the U.S. transfers arms to the nations in the MENA.  A good argument 
could be made that these variables would have a negative effect for MENA countries since the 
majority of recipient nations lack democratic political institutions and are considered not free.  
This finding suggests that the U.S. is not concerned with transferring arms to countries that do 
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not share similar values or forms of government.  This may be because some other factor has 
more import and ultimately bears more weight when the U.S. decides to transfer arms. 
 Trade could be one of the possible other factors.  The correlation between trade and arms 
transfers in the MENA region is the highest correlation when comparing it with NATO and with 
all other arms recipients as a whole.  The analysis suggests that trade levels may influence the 
U.S.’s decision to transfer arms within the region.  However, the analysis does not imply 
causation.  The relationship may be due to the abundance of natural gas and oil that is prevalent 
in much of the region, especially around the Persian Gulf.  This relationship may suggest that the 
U.S. is willing to transfer arms to region in exchange for access to its natural resources. 
 Security agreements in the region imply that they may have a larger role than other 
factors in determining the decision to send arms.  Well over half of the countries have some sort 
of security agreement with the U.S.  Six of the countries have an actual U.S. military base being 
used on their soil.  The initial research question asked whether or not there was a correlation 
between arms transfers and security agreements.  The data suggests that there is.  Security 
agreements and U.S. military presence in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf, could 
evidence that there is something strategically important to the U.S. within the region that not 
only requires the U.S. military, but also arming other nations with the help of the U.S. 
government.  The possible reasons for U.S. interest are numerous and may include access to 
natural resources, the proximity to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the threat of transnational 
terror originating in the region.  Whatever the case, the MENA region has received well over a 
quarter of U.S. arms transfers over a thirteen-year period and one of the most significant 
correlating factors is the presence of security agreements between recipient nations and the U.S. 
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 This research observed the variables of trade and security agreements in a broad sense.  
Trade was observed as the total amount of trade conducted between recipient nations and the 
U.S.  The research did not attempt to analyze what percentages of trade were from natural 
resources or other commodities.  Future research may wish to analyze this variable in a more 
detailed fashion in order to ascertain whether specific aspects of trade have more influence on 
the amount of arms. 
 Security agreements were observed by analyzing three factors consisting of Collective 
Defense Agreements, Status of Forces Agreements, and the presence of U.S. military 
installations.  Other factors may provide a clearer insight into the influences that security 
agreements have such as joint training agreements between the U.S. and recipient nation forces, 
diplomatic agreements such as the peace treaties between Israel and other MENA countries, or 
other aspects of the U.S.’s Security Cooperation efforts in the region.   
 For the purposes of this research, it would be fair to assume that security agreements and 
trade relations play a larger role in determining whether the U.S. transfers arms to the MENA 
region.  The findings contradict previous studies that imply that democratic institutions, human 
rights records, and individual freedoms are factored into the decision making process of 
providing arms to other countries.  There appears to be no room for democracy and liberties in 
the MENA arms bazaar.  Instead, security and economic concerns may be better indicators when 
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Appendix 1:  All Nations Receiving Arms from the U.S. 
 
Afghanistan	   Honduras Serbia 
Algeria	   Hungary Singapore 
Angola	   India Slovenia 
Argentina	   Indonesia South	  Africa 
Australia	   Iraq South	  Korea	  (ROK) 
Austria	   Ireland Spain 
Azerbaijan	   Israel Sri	  Lanka 
Bahrain	   Italy Sweden 
Bangladesh	   Jamaica Switzerland 
Belgium	   Japan Taiwan	  (ROC) 
Bolivia	   Jordan Thailand 
Botswana	   Kazakhstan Tunisia 
Brazil	   Kenya Turkey 
Brunei	   Kuwait UAE 
Bulgaria	   Latvia United	  Kingdom 
Cameroon	   Lebanon Venezuela 
Canada	   Lithuania Yemen 
Central	  African	  Republic	   Macedonia	   
Chad	   Malaysia 
Chile	   Malta 
Colombia	   Mexico 
Congo	   Morocco 
Costa	  Rica	   Namibia 
Croatia	   Netherlands 
Czech	  Republic	   New	  Zealand 
Denmark	   Niger 
Dominican	  Republic	   Nigeria 
DR	  Congo	   Norway 
Ecuador	   Oman 
Egypt	   Pakistan 
El	  Salvador	   Panama 
Equatorial	  Guinea	   Paraguay 
Estonia	   Peru 
Finland	   Philippines 
France	   Poland 
Gabon	   Portugal 
Georgia	   Qatar 
Germany	  (FRG)	   Romania 
Ghana	   Saudi	  Arabia 
Greece	   Senegal 
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Appendix 3:  NATO Nations Receiving Arms from the U.S. 
 
Belgium	   Slovenia 
Bulgaria	   Spain 
Canada	   Turkey 
Czech	  Republic	   United	  Kingdom 
Denmark	  
Estonia	  
France	  
Germany	  (FRG)	  
Greece	  
Hungary	  
Italy	  
Latvia	  
Lithuania	  
Netherlands	  
Norway	  
Portugal	  
Romania	  
 
